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Benefits and Costs of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms in U.S. Family Firms 
 
 
Abstract 
We analyze how founding families maintain control of large U.S. corporations, and at what cost. 
We find that indirect ownership through trusts, foundations, limited partnerships, and other 
corporations is prevalent but rarely creates a wedge between the family’s cash-flow and control 
rights. The primary sources of this wedge are dual-class shares and voting agreements among 
shareholders. Additional family control is frequently obtained through board representation in 
excess of voting control, and through the presence of a family member as CEO or Chairman of 
the Board. We also find that the impact of control-enhancing mechanisms on firm value depends 
on the specific mechanism used: the effect is negative for dual-class stock and disproportional 
board representation, but positive for pyramids and voting agreements. 
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 The desire of founders and their families to maintain control of their firms when their 
equity position declines leads to the creation of a range of control-enhancing mechanisms 
designed to give the family control rights in excess of their cash-flow rights. In the U.S. in 
particular, there are many instances of families who, with a relatively small equity stake, are able 
to exercise substantial control over corporate affairs through their voting control. For example, in 
Comcast, founder Ralph Roberts and his son Brian owned 3% of the firm’s equity in 2000, yet 
through dual-class stock, they controlled 86% of the votes. In the same year, the Ford family 
owned 6% of all shares outstanding in Ford Motor Company, but controlled 40% of the votes.  
 The wedge between families’ control rights and cash-flow rights illustrated by these 
examples is indeed rather prevalent among large family firms in the U.S., as shown by 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), but is certainly not unique to the U.S.  In their study of 27 wealthy 
economies, La Porta et al. (1999) show that controlling shareholders, many of which are families 
or individuals, often have substantial power in excess of their cash-flow rights, which they are 
able to achieve through dual-class stock, pyramidal ownership structures, and cross-holdings. 
Similar evidence is presented by Claessens et al. (2000) for a sample of 2,980 East Asian firms 
spread across 9 countries, and by Faccio and Lang  (2002) for a sample of 5,332 firms in 13 
Western European countries.  
 While concentrated corporate ownership is less prevalent in the U.S. than in most other 
countries, the separation between control and cash-flow rights is not. La Porta et al. (1999) show 
that, in 17 of the 27 countries in their sample, the deviations from the one-share one-vote norm 
are lower than they are in the U.S. In fact, among the 12 countries they classify as having high 
shareholder protection, only one (Norway) exhibits greater deviations. This contrast is 
problematic, since share ownership concentration can mitigate the agency problem between 
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owners and managers described by Berle and Means (1932), but the separation of control and 
cash-flow rights can create substantial agency costs between large and small shareholders, as 
large shareholders can appropriate private benefits of control without incurring their fair share of 
the cost (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). This second type of agency problem can be particularly 
acute when the large shareholder is an individual or family, since the incentives for both 
monitoring the affairs of the company and expropriating private benefits are not as diffuse as 
they are in most institutions. The wedge between control and cash-flow rights can manifest itself 
in a wide range of corporate decisions––choice of investment projects, firm’s size and scope, 
transferring control of the firm––and ultimately affect value. Villalonga and Amit (2006) show 
that, in descendant-led firms, the agency problem between family and non-family shareholders is 
more detrimental to shareholder value than the classic agency problem between owners and 
managers. They also show that, in founder-led firms, families who use control-enhancing 
mechanisms to increase their vote ownership over and above their share ownership pay a price 
for control, in the form of a value discount.  
 In this paper we explore the trade-offs between the benefits and costs faced by families in 
their quest to maintain or enhance control of their firms. We do so using a carefully constructed 
data set extracted from proxy filings of all Fortune 500 firms between 1994 and 2000. We begin 
by asking: Who owns large U.S. corporations? And, how are they owned by their largest 
shareholders, in particular founders and their families?  We then examine the mechanisms that 
families use in U.S. firms to enhance control, and ask: How do these mechanisms work? How 
much leverage (in control) is gained through the use of each such mechanism? What is their 
impact on firm value? And lastly, what determines the choice of each mechanism? 
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 We find founding family ownership among blockholders, officers, or directors, in about 
40% of our sample firms. Families in these companies own an average of 15.3% of the equity, 
and 18.8% of the votes. Non-family blockholders own a higher percentage of family firms’ 
equity than families themselves (16.2%), but a lower fraction of the votes (13.2%). This negative 
control wedge for non-family blockholders also appears in non-family firms, particularly for 
institutional blockholders, which suggests that, when there are deviations from the one-share 
one-vote norm in non-family firms, insiders are the ones who benefit from it.  
Direct ownership is the most common form of family ownership in the U.S., and 
accounts for 62% of total family holdings of both shares and votes. Nevertheless, 80% of firms 
also use some form of indirect ownership, through trusts (66% incidence, 20% of total family 
holdings), foundations (37% incidence, 4% to 5% of total holdings); corporations (26% 
incidence, 8% of total holdings); and limited partnerships (19% incidence, 6% of total holdings).  
 Despite the prevalence of indirect ownership, we find that only in 11 firms does it create 
a wedge between the family’s cash-flow and control rights. This finding supports Morck’s 
(2005) premise that, in the U.S., pyramids are more the exception than the norm. The primary 
source of this wedge in the U.S. are dual-class shares, followed in importance by voting 
agreements among shareholders. We explain how each of these mechanisms contributes to 
enhance control by decomposing our wedge measures into three components: share ownership 
(or cash-flow rights), vote ownership (voting rights), and voting control (control rights). We also 
find that families’ board representation is often disproportional to the family’s ownership stake 
and even to their voting stake, and thus provides an additional form of control enhancement.   
 We find that the impact of control-enhancing mechanisms on firm value depends on the 
mechanism used: dual-class stock and disproportional board representation have a negative 
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impact, but the impact of pyramids and voting agreements is positive. Finally, we also 
investigate the determinants of the choice of each mechanism by family firm owners. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we describe our data. Section 
II documents the identity of large blockholders in U.S. corporations, and how family firms are 
owned. Section III shows how family shareholders maintain and enhance their control. Section 
IV presents our results about how the different control-enhancing mechanisms affect value, and 
Section V reports on why each mechanism is chosen. Section VI concludes. 
I. Data  
A. Database construction 
Our data set is a panel of 62,431 shareholder-firm-year observations, aggregated into 
3,006 firm-year observations of 515 Fortune 500 firms during the period 1994 to 2000. The 
sample includes all the firms that were in the Fortune 500 in any of these years, have Compustat 
data on sales, assets, and market value during that period, and whose primary industry is not 
financial services, utilities, or government. The sample firms’ primary industries span 61 two-
digit SIC codes. For those firms that meet these criteria, we include all years with data available 
between 1994 and 2000, even if the firm is not in the Fortune 500 list in a particular year.  
Our data collection process involves three distinct phases. In the first phase, we build a 
database at the individual shareholder level that covers, for each firm-year in the sample, all of 
its insiders (officers and/or directors), all of its blockholders (owners of 5% or more of the firm’s 
equity), and the five largest institutional shareholders. We compile our Phase I data set from four 
sources: (1) Proxy statements for detailed information about blockholder and insider ownership 
and about the firm’s voting and board structures, which we obtain from either the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Edgar database, or from Thomson Research; (2) Spectrum 
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data on institutional holdings; (3) Hoover’s, corporate websites, and web searches about 
company histories and family relationships; and, (4) various SEC filings, to clarify the identity of 
ultimate owners whenever their shares in the firm are held indirectly. This data set comprises 
62,431 shareholder-firm-year observations. 
The second phase of our data collection process consists on aggregating our shareholder-
level database from Phase I into firm-years, and obtaining data on various firm characteristics 
from four other sources: Compustat, the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP), the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which provides data on governance provisions 
in charters, bylaws, and SEC filings, and 10-Ks, from which we manually collect data on 
dividends paid to shares of various classes, including non-publicly traded classes. This 
aggregation results in 3,006 firm-year observations from 515 different firms. 
In the third phase, we produce a graphical representation and a detailed quantitative 
analysis of each family firm’s ownership and control structure. This analysis enables us to 
allocate family share- and voteholdings to the different investment vehicles (trusts, foundations, 
limited partnerships or corporations) and control-enhancing mechanisms (dual-class shares, 
voting agreements, and pyramids) used by families to control firms. 
B. Definition of family firms and founders  
In this paper, we define family firms as those in which the founder or a member of his or 
her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, director, or blockholder, either individually 
or as a group. The definition follows Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), and is the broadest one we can use with our data, as it does not require a minimum 
threshold for family ownership or control above those imposed by SEC reporting requirements. 
We purposely choose this definition so as to include as many family firms as possible in our 
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analysis of ownership and control mechanisms. As shown in Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
however, definition matters, particularly the distinction between first-generation (founder-run) 
firms, and second or later generation firms. In our analyses, we show how the results differ for 
these two groups of family firms.  
We consider as founders those individuals who are identified as such in at least two 
public sources and no other data source that we are aware of mentions a different person as the 
founder. Typically, the person who is publicly recognized as the founder is the one responsible 
for the early growth and development of the company (or a predecessor firm) into the business 
that it later became known for. This need not be the same individual who started and 
incorporated the company, nor the one who took it public.  Excluded from our definition of 
founders are: (1) executives who became the largest non-institutional shareholder in their 
company through the accumulation of stock-based compensation, through a spin-off, or through 
a management or leveraged buyout;1 (2) families behind investment management companies 
such as Fidelity (controlled by Edward Johnson and his daughter, Abigail), or Franklin 
Resources (controlled by brothers Charles and Rupert Johnson); and (3) general partners in 
venture capital funds or leveraged buyout funds such as KKR (controlled by Henry Kravis and 
George Roberts, who are first cousins). When there is more than one founder, either because 
there were two or more cofounders of the firm or because our sample firm is the outcome of a 
merger of family firms, we consider as the founding family the one with the largest voting stake.  
C. Descriptive statistics 
Table I provides descriptive statistics for the full sample, broken down by family and 
non-family firms, and by family firm generation. Family firms represent about 40% of our 
                                                 
1 The one exception is Cardinal Health, whose predecessor firm Cardinal Foods was acquired through an LBO by 
Robert Walter, yet he is generally perceived as Cardinal’s founder after he shifted the company’s core business to 
health services. 
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sample; 1,183 family firm-years from 210 different firms. Of these, 540 firm-years (from 101 
firms) are in their first generation, and 643 firm-years (from 117 firms) are in their second or 
later generation. The remaining 1,823 firm-years come from 333 non-family firms. As implied 
by these numbers, there are 8 family firms (101 + 117 – 210) that experience a succession from 
first to second or later generation during our sample period, and 28 firms (210 + 333 minus 515) 
that experience a transition from the family to the non-family category (or viceversa).  
On average, family firms have a significantly higher Tobin’s q (with or without adjusting 
industry adjustments) and are smaller than non-family firms, but not significantly so. They are 
also significantly younger (62 versus 76 years old) and exhibit higher growth and market risk 
than non-family firms. Relative to non-family firms, family firms make significantly higher 
capital expenditures and have lower leverage. However, there are no significant differences in 
ROA between the two groups.  
While some of these differences may seem counter-intuitive, the last three columns in 
Table I show that they are largely driven by the first-generation (founder-led) firms in the 
sample. In fact, second and later generation family firms, while still smaller than non-family 
firms, are older and have a lower average q than them (and than founder-led firms), lower risk 
and capital expenditures, and identical sales growth to non-family firms. 
D. Dual-class stock  statistics 
Table II describes the dual share class structures used by our sample firms. Panel A 
reports the frequency of use of these structures by family and non-family firms. 773 firm-years 
from 171 firms (a third of the sample), have two or more classes of stock, including common, 
preferred, and tracking stock. Of these firms, 304 firm-years from 64 firms have two or more 
classes of common stock, i.e. dual-class stock proper. In 214 of these 304 firm-years, at least one 
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class of common stock is not publicly traded, typically one with superior voting rights (in 120 
firm-years). 
Dual-class stock is more common among family firms, particularly second and later 
generation firms, than among non-family firms: 62% of all dual-class firm-years are from family 
firms, despite the fact that family firms are only about 40% of the entire sample. Families are 
also more likely to keep private at least one of the classes (148 or 70% of the 214 firm-years are 
from family firms), especially the superior voting class the superior voting class (96 or 80% of 
the 120 firm-years are also from family firms).  
Panel B shows that the differences in voting rights across share classes are also more 
pronounced in family firms, especially those in their second or later generation. For instance, the 
ratio of votes per share between the inferior and superior voting classes averages 0.46 for family 
firms (0.31 considering only dual-class stock proper), and 0.64 (0.58) for non-family firms. (The 
closer the ratio is to zero, the larger the difference across classes in their voting rights; a ratio of 
one would be indicative of no difference). We report the frequency and voting ratios of multiple 
classes of stock including both common, preferred, and tracking stock because tracking and 
preferred stock, particularly convertible preferred, often entitle their holders to different voting 
rights from those of common stockholders, and not just different cash flow rights (dividends and 
liquidation). However, because preferred stock frequently has no voting rights at all, we exclude 
nonvoting preferred stock from the computation of voting ratios. 
Panel B of Table II also provides further detail on the distribution of voting arrangements 
among the dual-class firms in our sample (those with at least two classes of common stock).  
Consistent with the evidence in Zingales (1995) and Gompers et al. (2004), the most common 
voting ratio is 1:10. Zingales (1995) attributes this phenomenon to the American Stock Exchange 
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(AMEX) listing requirement, dating back to the admission of Wang Labs in 1976, that dual-class 
stock firms have voting ratios greater or equal to 1:10. In our sample, 68 out of 304 firm-years 
have a 1:10 voting ratio, and 63 have ratios higher (i.e. more equitable) than that, but still lower 
than 1:1. On the other hand, 55 firm-years have at least one class of nonvoting common stock 
(which effectively creates a ratio of zero), and an additional 21 firms have voting ratios greater 
that zero but lower than 1:10. 97 dual-class stock firm-years have a voting ratio of 1:1, but half 
of them (49) entitle the holders of one of the classes to superior voting rights with respect to the 
election of directors. (Some of the less equitable voting arrangements that we have included in 
other categories also include different rights with respect to the election of directors). 
The distribution of voting arrangements across firms also provides more detail into the 
finding that less equitable voting arrangements are more prevalent among family firms than 
among non-family firms. 67 of the 68 firm-years with a 1:10 voting ratio are from family firms, 
as are 18 of the 21 firm-years with lower ratios and 35 of the 49 firm-years where the only 
difference in voting rights across share classes relates to the election of directors. In contrast, 
non-family firms represent 45 of the 63 firm-years with voting ratios more equitable than 1:10, 
and 37 of the 48 firm-years where there is no difference in voting rights across classes. The legal 
minimum voting ratio of 1:10 thus appears to be a binding constraint for family firms, but not for 
non-family firms. 
Panel C reports on the dividend characteristics of dual-class stock firms. We only report 
dividend information for firms with two or more classes of common stock since preferred stock 
typically has different dividend rights by definition. We collect dividend data for all share 
classes, including non-traded classes, from 10-K reports. Similar to the voting ratio, we measure 
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dividend inequality across common stock classes through a ratio of the lowest-to-highest 
dividend per share. The average dividend ratio is 0.89, while the median is one. 
Panel C also shows that, while family shareholders benefit from superior voting rights to 
a greater extent than controlling shareholders in non-family firms, these benefits come at the 
expense of receiving lower dividends. Family firms have a more equitable ratio than non-family 
firms (0.91 vs. 0.85), and when they hold stock of a superior voting class, such class tends to 
have lower dividends than others (25 out of the 28 firm-years where this happens are from family 
firms). In contrast, in 26 firm-years, the holders of the superior voting class also hold superior 
dividend rights relative to other classes. This form of “double-dipping” is relatively more 
prevalent among non-family firms: 10 of those firm-years are from family firms and 16 from 
non-family firms, which represent, respectively, 5% of all family firm-years and 14% of all non-
family firm-years among dual-class firms. 
II. Ultimate ownership of U.S. corporations 
A. Who owns U.S. corporations? 
In this section we describe the ownership of shares and votes in our sample firms by 
founding families and other significant blockholders reported in proxy statements as beneficial 
owners of 5% or more of each company’s equity. In addition to the number of shares of each 
class that are held by each officer, director, or blockholder, proxies provide detailed information 
in footnotes about how these shares are owned. Shares can be owned with investment and voting 
power, or with only one of the two powers. Share ownership with only one of the two powers 
results from voting agreements among shareholders, whereby a shareholder cedes the voting 
power over his or her shares to another. For instance, in 2000, Katharine Graham and her four 
adult children hold investment and voting power over 44.9% of all shares outstanding in the 
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Washington Post in 2000. Berkshire Hathaway, of which Warren Buffett and his wife own 
approximately 33.6%, holds investment power over 18.3% shares of the Washington Post. 
Pursuant to an agreement dated 1977 and extended in 1996, Warren Buffett, Berkshire, and its 
subsidiaries have granted Katharine Graham’s son Donald Graham a proxy to vote such shares at 
his discretion. As a result, the Graham family actually has voting power over 63.2% of the Post’s 
shares, but investment power over 44.9% (all of which are included in the 63.2%).  
Proxy statements sometimes describe or at least mention these agreements, but more 
often, we just observe the outcome of the agreements in the form of a discrepancy between the 
number of shares held with investment power and the number of shares held with voting power. 
Each of the two powers can in turn be held by the officer, director, or blockholder alone (sole 
ownership), or be shared with other shareholders whose name may or may not appear in the 
proxy (shared ownership). We are thus able to distinguish between six different forms of share 
ownership in U.S. corporations, as summarized in Figure 1. 
Table III reports the percentage ownership of shares and votes by founding families and 
non-family blockholders. Share ownership refers to shares held by the family or blockholder 
with investment power (with or without voting power), in sole form or shared within the family 
or with family representatives such as cotrustees.2 It provides a measure of shareholders’ cash-
flow rights. Vote ownership refers to the votes associated to the shares held by the family or 
blockholder with voting power (with or without investment power), in sole or shared form. It 
                                                 
2 There are only two companies where we find shared investment power between family and non-family 
shareholders: Ralston Purina, and Anixter. In both cases we attribute 50% of the investment power to the family 
shareholder(s). In Ralston Purina, brothers Donald Jr. and William Danforth share investment and voting power over 
a fraction of their shares with an institution that changes over the years (first Boatmen’s Bancshares, then Nation’s 
Bank, and later Bank of America). In Anixter, a large fraction of the shares attributed to founder Samuel Zell in the 
proxy are held by three limited partnerships. The general partners are the Samuel Zell Revocable Trust and the 
Robert H. and B. Ann Lurie Trust, of which Ann Lurie, the widow of cofounder Robert Lurie, is a trustee. A change 
in the company’s ownership structure in 1998 reveals an that Zell and Lurie were indeed 50/50 partners.  
 
 12
provides a measure of shareholders’ voting rights, similar to those used in earlier studies of dual-
class shares and the voting premium (e.g. Zingales, 1995; Gompers et al., 2004). If there are 
multiple share classes with differential voting rights, the total number of votes outstanding in the 
company will differ from the total number of shares outstanding, and the family or blockholder’s 
vote ownership may differ from the percentage of shares they hold with voting power. As 
explained above and summarized in Figure 1, however, vote and share ownership may differ 
even in the absence of dual-class shares.  
Later in the paper we show that the voting power conferred upon shareholders by means 
of their share ownership and dual-class shares can be further enhanced by pyramidal control, so 
that the percentage of votes controlled may in fact exceed the percentage of votes owned. The 
percentage of votes controlled provides a measure of control rights that is similar to those used in 
studies of ultimate ownership such as La Porta et al (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), or Faccio and 
Lang (2002). 
 On average, families own 15.3% of their firms’ equity, and 18.8% of the votes. These 
percentages are in fact larger for second-generation firms (16.1% and 20.3%) than they are for 
first-generation firms (14.4% and 17.1%). Non-family blockholders on average own a slightly 
higher percentage of family firms’ equity than families themselves (16.2%), yet the voting rights 
associated to those shares are substantially lower (13.2%). Share ownership by large 
blockholders is larger in non-family firms (22.1%), as one might expect. Perhaps more 
unexpectedly, the voting rights of those blocks are also lower (18.8%) than their cash-flow 
rights. The result is entirely attributable to institutional shareholders; for individual (non-
founder) owners of non-family firms, share and vote ownership are identical, yet small (0.8%). 
This bears the question of who benefits from the separation between cash-flow and voting rights 
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in non-family firms. Gompers et al. (2004) show that insiders (officers and directors) generally 
do. We find that, among large shareholders (who include some of those insiders), only founding 
families benefit. All other blockholders are in fact harmed by it. The implication for non-family 
firms is that dual-class stock reduces the ability of outside blockholders to effectively monitor 
insiders. 
These differences between share and vote ownership and between family and non-family 
blockholders motivate our study of control-enhancing mechanisms and justify our focus on 
family firms. All subsequent analysis are therefore conducted on the subsample of family firms.   
B. How are U.S. family firms owned? 
To understand how families control U.S. corporations, we begin by analyzing how these 
corporations are owned. Table IV summarizes the results of this analysis. The most prevalent 
form of family ownership in the U.S. is direct ownership: 96% of all family firms in the sample 
(1,137 out of 1,183 firm-years, or 201 out of 210 firms) have at least some direct ownership by 
their controlling families. Yet the average percentage of total family holdings that is held directly 
is considerably lower (62%). Fully or almost fully direct ownership seldom occurs, but it does in 
a few of the younger firms in our sample, like Microsoft, Oracle, Reebok, Seagate, Southwest 
Airlines, Sysco, or Worldcom. At the other extreme are companies where the only shares held 
directly by the family are those that arise from management compensation—either shares that 
have been awarded in the year and not yet been contributed to the family trust or other 
investment vehicle, or stock options that are exercisable but not yet exercised, which are 
typically included in the share ownership count in proxy statements. 
As Table IV shows, indirect ownership is also very prevalent: In 80% of the sample firms 
(168 firms), families use one or more investment vehicles, such as trusts, foundations, limited 
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partnerships, or corporations, to hold their shares. Indirect ownership accounts for the remaining 
38% of families’ total average holdings of shares and votes. Following La Porta et al. (1999), 
when there is indirect ownership we compute the family’s share ownership or cash-flow rights as 
the product of its ownership stakes along the chain of control, but the votes controlled are 
measured by the weakest link in the control chain. Of the total average holdings, 3.4% cannot be 
apportioned among different investment vehicles, for instance because the shares are held in a 
limited partnership whose general partner is a trust. Such investment vehicle chains, which we 
refer to in Table IV as hybrids, are rare, however. For the most part, family holdings in U.S. 
corporations take the form of radial ownership structures, where total ownership of shares and 
votes can be cleanly separated into investment vehicles, even when the family uses a 
combination of different vehicles. An example of a radial ownership structure is Murphy Oil’s, 
shown in Figure 2. In contrast, Estée Lauder, depicted in Figure 3, has two hybrid components: a 
trust-plus-limited partnership, and a corporation-plus-limited partnership. 
The most commonly used vehicles are trusts of various natures: charitable and non-
charitable, revocable and irrevocable, voting trusts, and others. 66% of firms (139 firms) use 
trusts, which average 17% of total family holdings only in pure form, or almost 20% including 
hybrid forms. While trusts are typically formed for tax and estate planning reasons, some of them 
have a clear control purpose, serving either as a vehicle for a coalition of shareholders or as a 
separate entity that holds the family’s superior voting shares. For instance, in Carnival, the 
Arison family (of four) uses 13 trusts of different types to hold their 66% ownership and 81% 
voting stake in the company, including a “B” trust where all outstanding B-class (super-voting) 
shares are held. In the following section we examine the empirical relation between specific 
investment vehicles and specific control-enhancing mechanisms. 
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The second most commonly used investment vehicles are foundations, which are used by 
37% of all sample firms. We include in this category charitable funds and endowments as well as 
actual foundations, but the latter constitute the majority. The only funds in the sample are the 
Alden and Vada Dow Fund in Dow Chemical, the Conrad N. Hilton Fund in Hilton Hotels and 
Park Place Entertainment (a spinoff of Hilton Hotels), the Ingram Charitable Fund in Ingram 
Micro, and the Golden Family Charitable Fund in the New York Times (Michael Golden is a 
member of the founding family Ochs-Sulzberger). The only endowment is the Howard Heinz 
Endowment in H.J. Heinz Co. Most of these companies also have family foundations. 
Altogether, the foundations category in pure form represents 4.6% of total family shareholdings 
and 4.3% of total voteholdings, or 5.3% and 5.0% including hybrid forms. They are the only 
investment vehicle where families’ share ownership exceeds their vote ownership. 
Corporations are the third most commonly used investment vehicle, yet they are the 
second in size; corporations in pure form hold 8.2% of families’ total shareholdings and 8.5% of 
their total voteholdings. Including hybrid forms, these figures amount to 10.3% and 10.6%, 
respectively. Corporations include both Limited Liability Corporations and C-Corporations, and 
range from pure holdings to companies with business activities. Limited partnerships in which 
the family or another family-controlled entity is the general partner hold another 4.7% (6% 
including hybrids) of family share- and voteholdings. 
The numbers discussed above inform us about the distribution of family holdings across 
different investment vehicles, but are silent about the size of these holdings. To fill this gap, the 
last two columns of Table IV report, for the different ownership categories, the annual dollar 
value of family holdings for the entire sample, averaged over the sample period. The total value 
of family holdings is $240 billion, which is split almost evenly between the direct and indirect 
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ownership categories. Within the latter, limited partnerships, despite being the least frequently 
used investment vehicle, are where the most family money is invested ($51.8 billion, or $56.5 
billion including hybrid forms). At the other extreme are family foundations, which house $4.6 
billion ($5.6 including hybrids) of families’ total investment in their firms. The magnitude of 
these investments helps us understand why the wealth management industry and family offices 
in particular are flourishing. It also highlights the importance of studying family firms, especially 
among large public firms like the Fortune 500, where family ownership is less prevalent than 
among smaller firms and foreign firms, yet is highly relevant on a value-weighted basis. 
III. How are family firms controlled in the U.S.? 
In this section we analyze the primary mechanisms used by families to enhance their 
control of U.S. firms over and above what their sheer ownership stake would entitle them to. 
Earlier studies of the separation of ownership and control have focused on three such 
mechanisms: Dual-class shares, pyramids, and cross-holdings (La Porta et al (1999); Bebchuk et 
al. (2000); Claessens et al. (2000); Faccio and Lang (2002)). We find no instances of cross-
holdings in our sample, so we focus on dual-class shares and pyramids.3 In addition, our detailed 
data set enables us to analyze two more control-enhancing mechanisms that have not been 
considered in those studies: voting agreements, and disproportional board representation.  
A. Dual-class stock, voting agreements, and pyramids 
Dual-class stock, voting agreements, and pyramids all provide families with the benefit of 
increased voting control relative to their share ownership. However, each mechanism impacts 
                                                 
3 We do not find any cross-holdings as defined by La Porta et al. (1999), who say “there is cross-shareholding by 
sample firm A in its control chain if A owns any shares in its controlling shareholder or in the companies along that 
chain of control.” As suggested by our discussion of hybrid investment vehicles and the Estée Lauder example, 
however, we do find multiple chains of control as defined by Faccio and Lang (“each of which includes at least 5% 
of the voting rights at each link”), which Claessens et al. (2000) include among cross-holdings. We classify those 
multiple chains of control or hybrid investment vehicles as pyramids whenever they create a wedge between control 
rights and ownership rights; otherwise we do not consider them as control-enhancing mechanisms. 
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control in a different way. As described in the previous section, voting agreements in this paper 
refer to pacts among shareholders that result in the family holding voting power over a larger 
number of shares than what it owns with investment power. The presence of these agreements 
thus creates a discrepancy between cash-flow and voting rights even in companies where there 
are no dual-class shares with differential voting rights. In the Washington Post / Berkshire 
Hathaway example, the Post has two classes of common stock, yet both are entitled to one vote 
per share. Thus, the difference between the Graham family’s percentage ownership of shares and 
votes is entirely attributable to their voting agreement with Warren Buffet.  
Like voting agreements, dual-class shares enhance control by creating a wedge between 
the percentage of votes owned by the family and the percentage of shares they own. In the case 
of dual-class shares, the wedge is due to the superior voting rights associated to the shares held 
by the family with voting power, and will exist even when the number of shares held with voting 
power is equal to the number of shares held with investment power. Examples of dual-class 
companies in our sample where the founding family’s voting rights greatly exceed its cash-flow 
rights include Comcast, where, in 2000, the Roberts family owned 3.14% of the shares but 
85.64% of the votes; Viacom, where, in 2000, the Redstone family owned 13.3% of the shares 
but 67.55% of the votes; Tyson Foods, where, in 1998, the Tyson family owned 45.41% of the 
shares but 89.05% of the votes; and Ford Motor Co., where, in 1998, the Ford family owned 6% 
of the shares but 40% of the votes. 
In contrast, pyramids enhance control by creating a wedge between the percentage of 
votes owned and the percentage of votes controlled. Following La Porta et al. (1999), we define 
a firm’s ownership structure as a pyramid if the family holds its shares of the firm indirectly, 
through one or more investment vehicles in which the family owns less than 100% but more than 
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20%.4 Unlike prior studies in this literature, we do not require the family’s investment vehicles to 
be publicly traded for an indirect ownership structure to be considered as a pyramid, because we 
are not constrained by our data to do this, and families can and do enhance their control of firms 
via privately held investment vehicles. 
We use the example of Amerada Hess, depicted in Figure 4, to show how pyramids 
enhance family control. In 1999, for instance, founder Leon Hess and his son John Hess own 
15.13% of the firm’s equity through a combination of direct and indirect ownership through 
multiple investment vehicles; they hold 11.39% directly (10.65% + 0.73%), 0.1% in two trusts 
(0.03% + 0.07%), 2.04% through the Hess Foundation, and 1.6% through nine corporations. 
Because there are no dual-class shares or voting agreements, the percentage of votes owned also 
equals 15.13%. However, the percentage of votes controlled is slightly higher because the 1.6% 
owned through corporations constitute a pyramid. Leon Hess owns 11.5%, and owns a 50% 
equity interest in another corporation that owns 34%, of the capital stock of Galaxie Corporation, 
of which Capitol Street Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary. Capitol Street Corp. in turn 
owns 0.12% of Amerada Hess’s equity. Thus, Leon Hess owns 0.034% of Amerada Hess 
through this control chain (28.5%*0.12%), and controls 0.12%, which is the minimum of 28.5% 
and 0.12%. He also owns 80% in five other corporations that own 0.19% of Amerada Hess, thus 
owning an additional 0.16% (80%*0.19%) and controlling an additional 0.19% in the company. 
John Hess also owns slightly less that 100% (99.33%) in a corporation that owns 1.42% of 
Amerada Hess, which entitles him to 1.41% of cash-flow rights but 1.42% of control rights in the 
                                                 
4 Less than 100% ownership is required for indirect ownership to create a wedge between votes owned and 
controlled; for instance, Sumner Redstone owns almost all of his stock in Viacom through National Amusements, 
Inc., a company founded by his father that owns between 61% and 85% of the votes in Viacom during our sample 
period. While Sumner Redstone controls only two thirds of National Amusements, his two children each control a 
sixth. Thus the Redstone family controls 100% of National Amusements, and there is no additional wedge created 
by the indirect ownership structure over and above the wedge created by dual-class shares. The 20% threshold is 
arbitrary, but is generally considered enough to have effective control of a firm (La Porta et al., 1999). 
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company. Altogether, father and son control a total of 15.26% of the votes in Amerada Hess, or 
0.13% more than what they own. 
When families use more than one of these mechanisms, the benefits they reap in terms of 
increased control are compounded. For instance, in 1996, Ted Turner and his wife (Jane Fonda) 
own 37.5% of Turner Broadcasting’s shares with investment and voting power. By virtue of a 
voting agreement, Mr. Turner also holds an additional 1.36% of shares with voting power but no 
investment power. Moreover, the company has two classes of common stock and a third class of 
preferred stock, all with different voting rights, which entitle the Turners to a total of 67.44% of 
all votes outstanding. In 2000, the Cox family owns 65.69% of all shares in the company. 
Through dual-class shares, they own 75.17% of all votes. Through their pyramidal ownership via 
Cox Enterprises, of which they own 98.4% (263 other people own the remaining 1.6%), they 
control an additional 1.19% of votes in Cox Communications, for a total voting control stake of 
76.36%. Figure 5 shows Cox Communications’ ownership structure. 
In our empirical analysis of the benefits of the different control-enhancing mechanisms, 
we measure the wedge between share ownership and voting control in two separate ways: as a 
difference and as a ratio. We decompose this wedge into the difference (or ratio) between share 
and vote ownership––what voting agreements and dual-class stock enhance––, and the difference 
(or ratio) between vote ownership and control––what pyramids enhance––, as follows. If O 
denotes the percentage of shares owned (cash-flow rights), V denotes the percentage of votes 
owned (voting rights), and C denotes the percentage of votes controlled (control rights),  
Wedge measured as difference:  (C – O) = (V – O) + (C – V)                                         (1) 
Wedge measured as ratio:   C/O = V/O × C/V                                                                  (2) 
 20
In the Cox Communications example, the different wedge measures are coded in as: (C – 
O) = 10.67%;  (V – O) = 9.48%;  (C – V) = 1.19%; C/O = 1.16; V/O = 1.14;  C/V = 1.02. 
Table V shows the results of this analysis. Panel A reports sample-wide average wedges, 
broken down into first-generation and second or later generation firms. On average, families’ 
control rights exceed their cash-flow rights by a difference of 3.9% or a ratio of 1.28 times. By 
way of comparison, Claessens et al. (2000) report, for their sample of East Asian corporations, a 
ratio of cash-flow rights to what we call control rights of 0.746, which is equivalent to a ratio of 
control rights to cash-flow rights of 1.34. Faccio and Lang’s (2002) equivalent ratio for their 
sample of  Western European companies is 1.15. This international comparison suggests that the 
potential agency conflict between large family shareholders and minority shareholder in the U.S. 
is at least as relevant as in the rest of the world.  
Table V also shows that most of the separation between cash-flow and control rights in 
the U.S. comes from the excess of voting rights over cash-flow rights, which suggests that dual-
class stock and/or voting agreements, but not pyramids, are the dominant control-enhancing 
mechanism: the difference is 3.6%, which comes from the 18.8% votes owned minus 15.3% 
shares owned reported in Table III (with some rounding error). The ratio is 1.27 times.  
The breakdown by generation shows that the overall separation between ownership and 
control is higher in second and later generation firms than in first-generation firms, which is 
consistent with the notion that families implement these mechanisms to reduce the adverse effect 
on family control that naturally arises from firm and family growth. This is also the case for the 
separation between vote and share ownership, but not for the separation between vote ownership 
and control, which is substantially higher for first-generation firms (0.6% as compared to 0.1% 
for second or later generation firms). The implication is that first-generation firms are the 
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primary beneficiaries of the effect of pyramids in the sample. These results raise the question of 
whether these firms use pyramids with relatively greater frequency, and/or with a relatively 
greater impact on control enhancement. Likewise, there is a question as to whether second or 
later generation firms use dual-share classes and voting agreements with higher frequency or 
with a higher impact than first-generation firms. 
The answer is given in Panel B, which reports the average wedges attained by companies 
that use one or more control-enhancing mechanisms. 62 firms (30% of the sample) use one or 
more control-enhancing mechanisms at some point during our sample period. Families’ control 
rights in these firms are twice as large as their cash-flow rights; the difference is 13.7%. The 62 
firms include 21 first-generation firms, or 21% of all such firms, and 42 second or later 
generation firms, or 36% of all such firms (one firm is included in both groups). Therefore, 
second and later generation firms use control-enhancing mechanisms with relatively higher 
frequency. However, the wedge between ownership and control, and both of its components, is 
larger in first-generation firms. 
Panel C of Table V reports the frequency of use and the wedge created by each of the 
three mechanisms in the companies that use them. Dual-class shares with differential voting 
rights are the dominant way of increasing family control, in terms of both incidence and impact 
on control; 21% of all sample firms (44 firms) have dual-class stock at some point during the 
sample period, which yields an average wedge between cash-flow and voting rights of 20.5%, or 
2.55 times. Voting agreements and pyramids are comparable in their relevance, but voting 
agreements are both more prevalent (15 firms vs. 11), and more effective as a means of 
enhancing family control (6.5% difference vs. 6.2%, or 1.5 ratio vs. 1.31). Therefore, however 
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common indirect ownership is among U.S. family firms, it seldom serves to create a wedge 
between families’ cash-flow and control rights like it does in other countries. 
These results are consistent with the findings of La Porta et al. (1999), who report a 
complete absence of pyramids and cross-shareholdings among the 20 largest U.S. firms, but an 
average ownership stake required to control 20% of the votes of only 19.65%, the second lowest 
among the 12 countries they classify as having high shareholder protection. The 21% incidence 
of dual-class firms that we find in our sample is considerably higher than the average of 17.61% 
reported by Faccio and Lang (2002) for family-controlled firms in Western Europe. It is also 
higher than the U.K. mean of 18.84%, which is also the median across all 13 countries in their 
sample. Yet European family firms have a much higher incidence of pyramids (13.81%, plus 
3.22% of firms with holdings though multiple chains). The scarcity of pyramids in the U.S. is 
also consistent with Morck’s (2005) arguments and historical evidence that pyramidal business 
groups largely disappeared from the U.S. in the 1930s as a result of inter-corporate dividend 
taxation and other tax reforms that rendered them prohibitively costly.  
B. Governance mechanisms that enhance family control 
 In addition to the use of dual-class stock, voting agreements, and pyramids, families can 
enhance control of their companies through their presence in the board and top management 
positions, and through governance provisions that limit the rights of minority shareholders. Table 
VI reports on the usage of these governance mechanisms in family firms, broken down into first-
generation and second or later generation firms.  
Panel A of Table VI shows that the fraction of family members or family representatives 
on the board averages 17.3% for the full sample of family firms; 16% for first-generation firms 
and 18.3% for second or later generation firms. Family representation among outside directors 
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(i.e. directors who are not also managers) is lower (10%), yet is much higher among inside 
directors (41%), particularly in first-generation firms (44.9%). When there is a nominating 
committee, family representation in it averages 19.1%, and is particularly high for second-
generation firms. The governance index, which is a count of the number of governance 
provisions in the firm’s charter, bylaws, or SEC filings that reduce shareholder rights (Gompers 
et al., 2003), averages 9.38 and is higher in second and later generation firms than in first-
generation firms. A higher index implies weaker corporate governance, at least in an 
antitakeover and insider entrenchment sense, which is what most of the provisions in the index 
are about. The difference we find across family firms in different generations is therefore 
consistent with our finding that first-generation firms have a greater wedge between ownership 
and control created by dual-class shares, voting agreements, and pyramids, despite their 
relatively less frequent use of these mechanisms. 
Table VI also shows that a family member serves as the CEO in 600 out of 1,183 family 
firm-years (51% of the sample), and as Chairman of the Board in 703 (59%). Both counts are 
higher in first-generation than in second and later generation firms, in absolute and in relative 
terms: Of the 540 first-generation firm-years, 323 (60%) have a founder-CEO and 381 (71%) 
have a founder-chairman; of the 643 second and later generation firm-years, 277 (43%) have a 
family-CEO and 322 (50%) have a family-chairman. We note that a family firm’s generation 
refers to the latest one found among its officers or directors. Hence, some of the family-CEOs or 
chairmen in those firms may be the firm’s founder, if a descendant serves as officer or director. 
 Of special relevance for the purpose of our study is the fact that the fraction of family 
members or family representatives on the board is often greater than the percentage of shares 
owned by the family, and can be even greater than the percentage of votes controlled by the 
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family, thus contributing to enhance family control over and above their voting control. 
Disproportional board representation is sometimes warranted by shareholders’ agreements, or is 
associated to dual-class stock, whereby the class held uniquely by the family grants them 
superior rights in the election of directors, even when it does not entitle them to superior voting 
rights. For instance, in the New York Times in 1998, there are two classes of common stock, A 
and B, which represent 99.56% and 0.44% of the total shares outstanding, respectively. Each 
share is entitled to one vote, but class A shareholders can only elect five of the 15 directors, 
while Class B stockholders are entitled to elect the other 10, or two thirds of the entire board. 
The Ochs-Sulzberger family own 17.9% of the company’s total shares outstanding, but 88.7% of 
all Class B shares. Using the letter B to denote the percentage of all board seats controlled by the 
family, we can extend our earlier definition of the wedge between the family’s ownership and 
control rights, and its components, as follows:  
Wedge measured as difference:  (B – O) = (V – O) + (C – V) + (B – C)                         (3) 
Wedge measured as ratio:   B/O = V/O × C/V × B/C                                                        (4) 
In the New York Times example, the wedge obtained by the Ochs-Sulzberger family is 
(B – O) = (B – C) = 48.8%; B/O = B/C = 3.73. Panel A of Table VI shows that, on average across 
the entire sample of family firms, the fraction of board seats controlled by the family exceeds the 
percentage of shares owned by the family by 2%, yet is smaller than the percentage of votes 
controlled by –1.9%. Panel B of the same table shows, however, that in 60% of the sample (705 
firm-year observations), the fraction of board seats controlled by the family does exceed the 
percentage of votes controlled, the average difference for those firms being 10%. In the rest of 
our analysis, we consider board representation in excess of voting control (measured by either (B 
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– C), B/C, or a dummy that equals one when B > C) as a fourth control-enhancing mechanism 
along with dual-class shares, voting agreements, and pyramids. 
IV. Impact of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms on Firm Value 
In this section we use multivariate OLS regressions (with clustered standard errors) to 
explore whether and how the impact of control-enhancing mechanisms on firm value differs 
across mechanisms. The negative value impact of family control in excess of their share 
ownership has been first documented by Claessens et al. (2002) for East Asia, by Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) for the U.S., and by Barontini and Caprio (2005) for Continental Europe, and can be 
interpreted as evidence that stock markets place a discount on large shareholders’ potential 
appropriation of private benefits of control.  
There is little evidence, however, about which of these mechanisms may be driving the 
results. Claessens et al. (2002) test for the differential impact of dual-class shares, pyramids, and 
cross-holdings by regressing q on dummy indicators for each mechanism, but find no significant 
impact on value of any of the three dummies. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2005), using Faccio and 
Lang’s (2002) European sample, test for the impact on q of interactions between dummies for 
each mechanism and the total control-ownership wedge achieved by controlling owners of firms.  
They find the effect to be more negative and significant for dual-class shares than for pyramids 
and cross-ownership. Both of these approaches are problematic, though, as our earlier example 
of Cox Communications illustrates. In Cox, a large fraction of the total (C – O) wedge of 10.67% 
is due to the use of dual-class shares, which are responsible for the 9.48% (V – O) wedge. Only 
the remaining 1.19% (C – V) wedge is due to pyramids. Using either dummies or interactions of 
dummies with the total wedge would give equal weight to both mechanisms; the interaction 
approach would attribute the total wedge of 10.67% to dual-class shares and the same amount to 
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pyramids, thus overstating the benefits (in terms of enhanced control) that families achieve 
through these mechanisms (particularly pyramids, in the case of Cox), and distorting the 
estimates of the mean effect of each mechanism on firm value. 
We solve this problem by using our decomposition of each firm’s total control-ownership 
wedge into the parts of that wedge created by different mechanisms to estimate the effect of each 
mechanism on firm value. Following earlier studies of ownership and performance since Morck 
et al. (1988), we use Tobin’s q, proxied by the firm’s market-to-book ratio, as our dependent 
variable, and interpret it as a measure of corporate value (scaled by assets). We use the market 
value of common equity plus the book value of preferred stock and debt as a proxy for the firm’s 
market value. For firms with multiple share classes, including at least one class that is not 
publicly traded, we compute the market value of common equity as the product of the total 
number of shares outstanding of all classes, by the share price of the traded shares. The approach 
amounts to valuing a firm’s nontradable stock at the same price per share as its tradable stock; 
equivalently, it assumes that the control premium and liquidity discount that nontradable shares 
with superior voting rights deserve cancel each other. 
To control for industry and time effects, we adjust our dependent variable by constructing 
it as the difference between the firm’s q and the asset-weighted average of the imputed qs of its 
segments, where a segment’s imputed q is the industry average q, and q is measured as before. 
We compute industry averages at the most precise SIC level for which there is a minimum of 
five single-segment firms in the industry-year. Similar results are obtained if we control for 
industry in a more crude way such as using 2-digit industry or sector (1-digit) dummies. 
Our key independent variables are the measures of additional control obtained through 
dual-class stock, voting agreements, pyramids, and disproportional board representation. We also 
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include, as measures of additional family control, dummies indicating the presence of a family-
CEO or chairman, the governance index, the percentage of shares owned by non-family 
blockholders, and the excess (or deficit) of vote ownership by non-family blockholders relative 
to their share ownership. In addition, our regression controls include measures of the firm’s stock 
market risk (systematic and idiosyncratic), which we estimate using CRSP data; corporate 
diversification (a dummy indicating if the firm has more than one segment); capital expenditures 
relative to fixed assets; dividends as a fraction of book equity; debt relative to the market value 
of equity, and the logarithm of assets as a measure of firm size (all from Compustat).  
Tables VII and VIII report the regression results for the full sample and for family firms 
only, as well as for the first- and second or later generation subsamples. The only difference 
between the analyses reported in both tables is in the measurement of the wedge obtained 
through the four control-enhancing mechanisms. In Table VII, the wedge measures are computed 
as differences, while in Table VIII they are computed as ratios. The disproportional board 
representation ratio has some extreme values at the top of its distribution, arising from the greater 
indivisibility of board seats relative to equity. For instance, the first year that Steve Jobs returns 
to Apple as the CEO (1998), he has only one share of common stock out of a total of 
132,761,530 shares outstanding, and is one of the six directors on the board, which gives him a 
disproportional board representation ratio of 22,126,922. To normalize the variable, we 
winsorize the ratio at the top 5% by making all values that are greater than 10 equal to 10.  
The results in both tables show that the impact of control-enhancing mechanisms on firm 
value differs across mechanisms: Dual-class stock has a negative impact on value, whereas 
voting agreements and pyramids have a positive effect. Disproportional board representation has 
a negative impact on value, but it is not statistically significant. The sign of the coefficients is 
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robust to the measure of the wedge used, but the significance changes for some variables, 
including the control-enhancing mechanisms. In particular, dual-class stock is only statistically 
significant when the wedge it creates is measured as a difference, while voting agreements is 
only significant when the wedge they create is measured as a ratio. The effect of pyramids is 
significant regardless of the measure used.  
The negative impact of dual-class shares on value sheds further light on Villalonga and 
Amit’s (2006) finding of a negative impact on value of the wedge between cash-flow and voting 
rights. As can be expected from the prevalence of dual-class stock over other mechanisms 
reported in Table V, the results in Table VII confirm that dual-class stock is the main driver of 
the negative impact documented by Villalonga and Amit (2006). The result is also consistent 
with Gompers et al. (2004), who find a positive value impact of insider share ownership in U.S. 
dual-class firms, but a negative impact of their fractional vote ownership, and with earlier 
evidence by Lease et al. (1983) and Zingales (1995) of a premium to supervoting shares in the 
U.S., which is usually interpreted as a proxy for the private benefits of control that large 
shareholders or insiders can extract from the firm. We find that the negative effect of dual-class 
stock on value is not significant among second and later generation firms, however. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that, in these firms, the presence of control-enhancing mechanisms 
may not convey such a strong signal of the family’s desire to expropriate minority shareholders 
as it does of family resistance to the dilution of their controlling stake when the firm grows. 
Perhaps more surprising, or at least more unique to this paper, is the finding that two 
control-enhancing mechanisms have a positive effect on value despite the wedge they introduce 
between the family’s cash-flow and control rights. One of them are pyramids, which are 
generally pooled with dual-class shares among the mechanisms that can enable the appropriation 
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of private benefits of control (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2000). One plausible explanation for this result 
is that, unlike dual-class stock and disproportional board representation, pyramids can exist for 
reasons other than maintaining or increasing family control. While pyramids can and sometimes 
do lend themselves to the expropriation of minority shareholders through tunneling practices 
(Johnson et al, 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002) they can also exist for more legitimate purposes. For 
instance, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) argue that pyramids may be desirable when internal 
funds are important and when the security benefits of a new firm added to a pyramid are low, 
conditions that typically hold in low investor protection environments. Khanna and Palepu 
(2000) provide evidence of internal capital markets advantages to pyramidal business groups in 
emerging markets. Morck (2005) argues that the few pyramids found in the U.S. tend to be 
temporary arrangements such as toeholds in preparation for complete takeovers, blockholdings 
left over from unsuccessful takeover bids, equity carve-outs where the spun-off firm is not yet 
fully divested from its parent, and equity cross-holdings between joint venture partners. Allen 
and Phillips (2000) show that such intercorporate equity holdings are often long-lasting and 
value-adding, particularly when they support strategic alliances and other product-market 
relationships among partner firms.  
Two of the 11 firms with pyramidal structures (56 firm-year observations) in our sample 
seem to fit with the latter type of explanation. In Mascotech (later renamed Metaldyne), Richard 
Manoogian controls between 9 and 15% over our sample period, through a combination of dual-
class shares and a pyramid with one intermediate public corporation, Masco, which Manoogian’s 
father founded in 1929. Mascotech was spun-off from Masco in 1984. Cox Communications, 
whose structure is depicted in Figure 5, is the cable business of the Cox family’s private media 
conglomerate, Cox Enterprises. Cox Communications became public in 1995 as part of a 
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takeover of the old Times Mirror, but was taken private again by the Cox family in 2004 (after 
our sample period ends). In the remaining firms with pyramidal structures, the pyramid is 
facilitated by either a holding corporation which does not seem to fit with any of the more 
legitimate business explanations, or by a corporation whose name and nature cannot be identified 
from the proxy. This is the case, for instance, of Amerada Hess (Figure 4). 
Voting agreements also have a positive effect on value, although this is likely due to very 
different reasons. Several theoretical papers have pointed out the benefits of shared control 
among large shareholders for firm value as a whole. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) show that 
founders can optimally choose an ownership structure with multiple large shareholders to force 
them to form coalitions to obtain control. In their model, by grouping member cash-flows, 
coalitions internalize to a larger extent the value consequences of their actions and hence take 
more efficient actions than would any of its individual members. Thus, coalitions serve as a 
commitment device. In Gomes and Novaes (2001), the governance role of shared control stems 
not only from only from reduced ex-ante incentives to appropriate private benefits at a high 
efficiency cost, but also from ex-post bargaining problems among controlling shareholders that 
raise the cost of such behaviors.  
On the other hand, the literature on blockholders has often highlighted the dark side of 
coalitions. The presence of a second large shareholder in a firm brings the benefit of monitoring 
or contesting the power of the largest shareholder (Pagano and Röell, 1998; Bloch and Hege, 
2003). Yet the cost is that is that the multiple blockholders can form a coalition and extract 
partial benefits of control, still at the expense of smaller, minority shareholders (Zwiebel, 1995; 
Maury and Pajuste, 2005). The evidence on which of these two effects––monitoring or 
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collusion–– prevails remains mixed. For instance, Faccio et al. (2001) find that the presence of 
multiple large shareholders dampens expropriation in Europe, but exacerbates it in Asia. 
We are able to throw light onto this question by distinguishing between actual coalitions 
(the voting agreements in our sample), and potential but unrealized coalitions with other large 
blockholders. We find that, while the effect of voting agreements on firm value is positive, the 
percentage of shares owned (and independently controlled) by non-family blockholders has a 
negative effect, which is significant for all firms except second and later generation family firms. 
Moreover, the wedge between votes and shares owned by these blockholders also has a negative 
effect on value, particularly significant for family firms (in Table VII) and first-generation firms 
(in Table VIII). Our results therefore support the theoretical arguments in favor of coalitions. In 
our sample, the coalition members are the founding families and the shareholders that cede them 
or share with them voting power over their shares. Even when the voting power is ceded 
completely, as is Warren Buffett’s case in the Washington Post, the non-family shareholder 
retains full dispositive power over his or her shares, so the family remains committed not to 
undertake unilateral actions.   
V. What determines the choice of control-enhancing mechanisms? 
 In light of the different benefits (increased control) and costs (impact on firm value) that 
dual-class stock, voting agreements, pyramids, and disproportional board representation seem to 
afford families, we now examine what determines the choice of those mechanisms in U.S family 
firms. Using probit models, we estimate the probability of having each of those mechanisms in a 
firm as a function of the following variables: other control-enhancing mechanisms used; 
investment vehicles used; presence of a family-CEO or chairman; firm generation; governance 
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index; blockholder ownership; Tobin’s q; and the same regression control variables included in 
our OLS regressions of Tables VII and VIII.  
 Table IX shows the results of this analysis. We find that the probability of using a 
specific mechanism to some extent depends of what other mechanisms are used. Dual-class stock 
is more likely to be used in the absence of voting agreements and disproportional board 
representation. In contrast, pyramids are more likely to appear when there are also voting 
agreements. Disproportional board representation is less likely when there are dual share classes 
with differential voting rights; we note, however, that our indicator of dual share classes only 
equals one when the two (or more) classes generate a difference between the family’s cash-flow 
and voting rights, but not when classes only differ in their rights to elect directors. These 
relationships are not always reciprocal: the choice of voting agreements is independent of what 
other mechanisms are used. 
 We also find that the way in which firms are owned affects the way in which they are 
controlled. Dual-class shares are significantly less likely the greater is the percentage of family 
holdings held in foundations (recall from Table IV that foundations are the only investment 
vehicle in which the percentage of shares owned exceeds the percentage of votes owned). 
Pyramids and disproportional board representation are positively related to the fraction of total 
family holdings that is placed in different investment vehicles; while voting agreements are 
negatively related to all. Yet the probabilities differ across investment vehicles. For instance, 
voting agreements are particularly less likely when there are more holdings in trusts, which 
suggests that most of the trusts in our sample do not serve a control purpose. Disproportional 
board representation is particularly more likely when there is greater direct ownership.  
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 The result reported in Table V about second and later generation firms being more 
frequent users of dual-class stock, voting agreements, and pyramids, is confirmed in Table IX 
after controlling for other determinants of the choice of these mechanisms, and supports our 
premise that families implement these mechanisms to counter the dilution of their equity stake 
that comes with firm and family growth. The decision to use these mechanisms, however, is 
independent of whether the family CEO or chairman is a family member or not. It is worth 
noting that the percentage of shares owned by non-family blockholders has no influence on the 
choice of any of the control-enhancing mechanisms. Given the evidence in Table III that these 
blockholders’ voting stake is in fact reduced by these mechanisms, it is not surprising that they 
do not foster their use. The finding that they do not prevent it either provides additional evidence 
of the limited monitoring role that these blockholders play for large family shareholders and 
insiders.  
 Tobin’s q negatively affects the likelihood of using any of the mechanisms, although not 
significantly in the case of voting agreements. Other firm characteristics like size, risk, capital 
expenditures, dividend policy and capital structure, affect the choice of some mechanisms but 
not of others.  
VI. Conclusion 
 In this paper we analyze how founding families own and control large U.S. corporations, 
why they choose to control them in the way they do, and what the consequences of this choice 
are for the value of the firm as a whole. We find that indirect ownership through trusts, 
foundations, limited partnerships, and other corporations is prevalent. Yet, unlike in other 
countries where pyramidal control is common, indirect ownership in the U.S. seldom creates a 
wedge between the family’s cash-flow and control rights. Dual-class shares and voting 
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agreements among shareholders are the primary sources of this wedge in U.S. family firms. 
Family control is also frequently enhanced through board representation in excess of voting 
control, and through the presence of a family member as CEO or Chairman of the Board.  
Our results show that the excess control that families are able to obtain over and above 
their equity stake through dual-class stock and disproportional board representation comes at the 
cost of reduced firm value. A compensating advantage that we cannot measure with our data are 
the personal diversification benefits that families gain by not being invested in their companies’ 
equity to the full extent of their controlling stake. Because of the difficulty of measuring this 
advantage (which would require knowledge of the family’s investments outside the firm), as well 
as private benefits of control, the net effect for families of using these mechanisms remains 
unknown. On the other hand, there seems to be no cost for families, but rather, an additional 
benefit in terms of increased firm value, from using voting agreements or pyramids to enhance 
family control. Our findings therefore suggest that controlling families in U.S. firms can reduce 
the costs of control-enhancing mechanisms for both themselves and minority shareholders 
through their choice of mechanisms. 
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Figure 2. Murphy Oil’s ownership structure in 1994.. Owners are represented with continuous lines and trust beneficiaries with discontinues lines. Michael 
W. Murphy and R. Madison Murphy are sons of founder C. H. Murphy, Jr. Claiborne P. Deming and William C. Nolan, Jr. are nephews of C. H. Murphy, Jr., 
and Caroline G. Theus is a niece of C. H. Murphy, Jr.  
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Figure 3. Estée Lauder’s ownership structure in 1996. “O” denotes ownership stakes; “V” denotes voting stakes. Owners are represented with continuous 
lines; trustees with dotted lines; general partners with dashed lines; and foundation directors with dash-dotted lines. Leonard and Ronald Lauder are sons of 
founder Estée Lauder. Evelyn Lauder is Leonard Lauder’s wife. William and Gary Lauder are Leonard’s sons. Aerin and Jane Lauder are Ronald’s daughters. 
Leonard and Ronald Lauder are also directors of the Lauder Foundation and trustees of the Estée Lauder trust. 
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Figure 4. Amerada Hess’s ownership structure in 1999. Owners are represented with continuous lines; trustees with dotted lines; and foundation directors 
with dash-dotted lines. John Hess is the son of founder Leon Hess.  
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Figure 5. Cox Communications’s ownership structure in 2000. “O” denotes ownership stakes; “V” denotes voting stakes. Owners are represented with 
continuous lines; trustees with dotted lines. Anne Cox Chambers and Barbara Cox Anthony are daughters of founder James Middleton Cox. James Cox Kennedy 
is son of Barbara Cox Anthony. Garner Anthony is husband of Barbara Cox Anthony, and James Cox Kennedy’s stepfather. Sarah Kennedy is James Cox 
Kennedy’s wife. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics for Family and Non-Family Firms 
Means, standard deviations (in italics), and tests of differences in means between family and non-family firms 
characteristics. Family firms are defined as those where one or more family members are officers or directors or own 
5% or more of the firm’s equity either individually or as a group. Tobin’s q is measured as the ratio of the firm’s 
market value to total assets.  For firms with non-tradable share classes, the non-tradable shares are valued at the same 
price as the publicly traded shares. Generation refers to the latest generation of founding family members that are 
officers, directors, or blockholders; equals one for the founder’s generation, two for the founder’s children, etc. ROA 
is measured as the ratio of operating income after depreciation to total assets. The governance index is the number of 
governance provisions in the firm’s charter, bylaws, or SEC filings that reduce shareholder rights (Gompers-Ishii-
Metrick (2003) measure). Beta is the estimate from a market model in which the firm’s monthly returns over the 
past five years are regressed on the S&P 500 monthly returns. Idiosyncratic risk is the standard error of the estimate 
from the market model. Diversification equals one if the firm has two or more segments in Compustat, zero 
otherwise. The sample comprises 3,006 firm-year observations of 515 Fortune 500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets 
during 1994-2000. t-statistics are based on clustered (by firm) standard errors from OLS regressions of each variable 
on a family firm dummy, and appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% 
(**), or 10% (*) level.  
 
  [a] 
  All 
Firms 
[b]
 Family 
Firms
[c]
Non-
Family 
Firms
Diff. in 
Means
[b] - [c]  
[d]
1st
Generation 
Family 
Firms
 [e] 
 2nd/Later 
Generation 
Family 
Firms 
Diff. in 
Means
[d] - [e]  
Tobin’s q  2.00 2.13 1.91 0.22 * 2.47 1.84 0.63 ***
 1.55 1.75 1.41 (1.69)  2.38 0.82 (2.88)  
Industry-Adjusted q  -0.33 -0.12 -0.46 0.34 *** 0.19 -0.38 0.57 ***
 1.39 1.53 1.26 (3.11)  1.98 0.95 (3.08)  
Assets ($ millions) 9,313 7,615 10,415 -2,800  6,287 8,731 -2,444  
 21,206 21,563 20,903 (-1.40)  10,400 27,613 (-0.82)  
Sales ($ millions) 9,108 7,816 9,946 -2,130  6,428 8,981 -2,553  
 16,296 16,333 16,221 (-1.40)  7,510 20,996 (-1.14)  
Firm Age since Founding 70.4 61.7 76.1 -14.4 *** 35.4 83.9 -48.5 ***
 41.7 39.1 42.3 (-3.89)  26.1 34.1 (-11.5)  
Sales growth 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.08 *** 0.30 0.13 0.18 ***
 0.61 0.76 0.48 (2.77)  0.80 0.72 (3.46)  
ROA 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.01  0.12 0.11 0.01  
 0.07 0.07 0.07 (1.45)  0.08 0.05 (1.10)  
Debt/Mkt Value of Equity 0.46 0.37 0.52 -0.15 *** 0.36 0.38 -0.02  
 0.97 0.76 1.08 (-2.75)  0.92 0.59 (-0.26)  
Market Risk (Beta) 1.05 1.08 1.02 0.06 ** 1.19 1.00 0.19 ***
 0.43 0.43 0.43 (1.98)  0.48 0.35 (3.73)  
CAPX/PPE 0.23 0.26 0.22 0.04 *** 0.31 0.21 0.10 ***
 0.22 0.30 0.14 (3.14)  0.41 0.13 (4.06)  
Number of Firm-Years 3006 1,183 1,823 540 643  
Number of Firms 515 210 333 101 117  
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Table II 
Dual-Class Stock Statistics for Family and Non-Family Firms 
 
Nonvoting preferred share classes are excluded from the computation of voting ratios 
 
 
 All 
Firms
Family 
Firms
 
Non-
Family 
Firms 
1st
Generation 
Family 
Firms
2nd/Later 
Generation 
Family 
Firms
A. Frequency of Use    
1. Number of Firm-Years (Firms) with Two or More  773 320 453 89 231
   Share Classes, Common or Preferred 171 76 101 24 53
2. Number of Firm-Years (Firms) with Two or More  304 188 116 62 126
   Common Share Classes (Dual-Class Firms) 64 41 25 16 25
   Of Which:    
  - At Least One Common Class is Not Publicly Traded 214 148 66 49 99
  - Superior Voting Class is Not Publicly Traded 120 96 24 20 76
    
B. Voting Arrangements    
1. Mean (Median ) Voting Ratio (Inferior-to-Superior)   0.56 0.46 0.64 0.51 0.44
  In Firms with Two or More Share Classes 0.50 0.20 0.91 0.43 0.16
2. Mean (Median ) Voting Ratio (Inferior-to-Superior)   0.41 0.31 0.58 0.41 0.26
  In Firms with Two or More Common Share Classes 0.15 0.10 0.60 0.10 0.10
3. Number of Dual-Class Firm-Years in Which:  
  - One Common Class is Non-Voting 55 39 16 17 22
  - Voting Ratio = 1:10 68 67 1 13 54
  - Voting Ratio > 1:10 63 18 45 3 15
  - Voting Ratio < 1:10 21 18 3 6 12
  - Voting Rights Only Differ for the Election of Directors 49 35 14 21 14
  - No Difference in Voting Rights across Classes 48 11 37 2 9
4. Mean of Min. % Shares Needed to Own 20% of Votes 15.7 13.12 17.53 13.72 12.90
    
C. Dividend Characteristics     
1. Mean (Median ) Common Dividend Ratio  0.89 0.91 0.85 0.95 0.90
  --Inferior-to-Superior in Dual-Class Firms-- 1 1 1 1 1
2. Number of Dual-Class Firm-Years in Which:  
  - Superior Voting Class Dividend is Lower 28 25 3 7 18
  - Superior Voting Class Dividend is Higher 26 10 16 0 10
  - No Difference in Dividends across Classes 250 153 97 55 98
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Table III 
Ownership of Shares and Votes by Families, Individuals and Institutions 
Shares owned refers to shares held with investment power by the family or blockholder, as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding. Votes owned refers to the votes associated to the shares held with voting power by the family or 
blockholder, as a percentage of total votes outstanding. Family firms are defined as those where one or more family 
members are officers or directors or own 5% or more of the firm’s equity either individually or as a group. The 
sample comprises 3,006 firm-year observations of 515 Fortune 500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-
2000.  
 Family Firms  Non-Family Firms 
 % Shares Owned % Votes Owned % Shares Owned % Votes Owned 
 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Founding Family 15.3% 17.1% 18.8% 22.7%    ––    ––    ––    –– 
 -  1st Generation  14.4% 15.3% 17.1% 20.1%    ––    ––    ––    –– 
 -  2nd /Later Generation 16.1% 18.5% 20.3% 24.6%    ––    ––    ––    –– 
Non-Family Blockholders 16.2% 22.4% 13.2% 16.5% 22.1% 24.9% 18.8% 24.5% 
a) Individual Blockholders 2.5% 13.4% 2.1% 7.3% 0.8% 4.2% 0.8% 4.2% 
   - Cofounders 0.2% 1.4% 0.2% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
   - Other Individual Blockholders 2.4% 13.3% 1.9% 7.1% 0.8% 4.2% 0.8% 4.2% 
b) Institutional Blockholders 13.7% 14.8% 11.2% 14.7% 21.3% 25.7% 18.0% 24.2% 
   - Mutual and Pension Funds 6.1% 8.7% 4.1% 8.3% 8.5% 12.5% 5.5% 9.5% 
   - Other Institutional Blockholders 7.6% 12.3% 7.1% 12.4% 12.8% 23.4% 12.5% 23.1% 
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Table IV 
Investment Vehicles in U.S. Family Firms 
Shares owned refers to shares held with investment power by the family, as a percentage of total shares outstanding. 
Votes owned refers to the votes associated to the shares held with voting power by the family, as a percentage of 
total votes outstanding. Votes controlled equal votes owned, plus any additional votes resulting from the family 
owning less than 100% but more than 20% in any of the investment vehicles. Trusts include voting trusts, charitable 
and non-charitable trusts, and any other form of trust. Foundations include charitable funds and endowments as well 
as foundations. Corporations include both Limited Liability Corporations and C-Corporations, and range from pure 
holdings to corporations with business activities. Hybrids are ownership structures that include multiple, non-
separable, investment vehicles. Total value of family holdings is summed across all companies and averaged over 
the full sample period. Family firms are defined as those where one or more family members are officers or directors 
or own 5% or more of the firm’s equity either individually or as a group. The sample comprises 3,006 firm-year 
observations of 515 Fortune 500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. The family firms subsample 
comprises 1,183 firm-year observations of 210 firms. 
 
No. of Firms 
Using Vehicle  
Mean % of All 
Shares Owned 
by Family  
Mean % of   
Votes Controlled 
by Family  
Total Value of 
Family Holdings 
($B) 
 Firms  
Firm-
Years 
Pure 
Form 
Pure or 
Hybrid 
Form 
Pure  
Form 
Pure or 
Hybrid 
Form 
Pure 
Form 
Pure or 
Hybrid 
Form 
Direct Ownership 201 1137 62.1%    –– 61.8%    –– 119    –– 
Indirect Ownership via: 168 875 37.9%    –– 38.2%    –– 121    –– 
  - Trust 139 682 17.0% 19.7% 17.1% 19.8% 34.4 39.7 
  - Foundation 77 340 4.6% 5.3% 4.3% 5.0% 4.56 5.58 
  - Corporation 55 271 8.2% 10.3% 8.5% 10.6% 23.5 27.8 
  - Limited Partnership 39 148 4.7% 6.0% 4.7% 6.0% 51.8 56.5 
  - Hybrid    ––    –– 3.4%    –– 3.6%    –– 6.74    –– 
Total Direct and Indirect 210 1183 100%    –– 100%    –– 240    –– 
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Table V 
Control-Enhancing Mechanisms in U.S. Family Firms 
This table reports the frequency of use and the wedge created by different control-enhancing mechanisms in U.S. 
family firms. Dual-class stock refers to voting structures in which the firm has issued two or more classes of stock   
with differential voting rights, excluding nonvoting preferred stock. Voting agreements refer to pacts among 
shareholders that result in the family holding voting power over a larger number of shares than what it owns with 
investment power. Pyramids refer to control structures where the family holds its shares of the firm indirectly, 
through one or more investment vehicles in which the family owns less than 100% but more than 20%. Family firms 
are defined as those where one or more family members are officers or directors or own 5% or more of the firm’s 
equity either individually or as a group. The sample comprises 3,006 firm-year observations of 515 Fortune 500 
firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. The family firms subsample comprises 1,183 firm-year 
observations of 210 firms. 
 Firms  
Firm-
Years  
% Votes 
Owned 
Minus % 
Shares 
Owned
% Votes 
Controlled 
Minus % 
Votes 
Owned
% Votes 
Controlled 
Minus % 
Shares 
Owned
% Votes 
Owned 
to % 
Shares 
Owned 
Ratio  
% Votes 
Controlled 
to % Votes 
Owned 
Ratio 
% Votes 
Controlled 
to % 
Shares 
Owned 
Ratio
A. All Family Firms 
1st Generation  101 540 2.7% 0.6% 3.2% 1.24 1.03 1.27
2nd /Later Generation 117 643 4.3% 0.1% 4.4% 1.29 1.00 1.29
Total  210 1183 3.6% 0.3% 3.9% 1.27 1.01 1.28
 
B. Family Firms Using One or More Control-Enhancing Mechanisms 
1st Generation  21 87 16.6% 9.8% 16.2% 2.51 1.49 2.37
2nd /Later Generation 42 190 13.0% 0.9% 12.4% 1.86 1.02 1.82
Total  62 277 14.0% 4.7% 13.7% 2.05 1.22 2.00
 
C. Usage of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms by Type 
Dual-Class Stock 44 184 20.5% 0.0% 20.5% 2.55 1.00 2.55
Voting Agreements 15 62 6.5% 0.0% 6.5% 1.50 1.00 1.50
Pyramids 11 56 0.0% 6.2% 6.2% 1.00 1.31 1.31
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Table VI 
Governance Mechanisms in U.S. Family Firms 
Family firms are defined as those where one or more family members are officers or directors or own 5% or more of 
the firm’s equity either individually or as a group. The governance index is the number of governance provisions in 
the firm’s charter, bylaws, or SEC filings that reduce shareholder rights (Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) measure). 
The sample comprises 3,006 firm-year observations of 515 Fortune 500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 
1994-2000. The family firms subsample comprises 1,183 firm-year observations of 210 firms. 
 
All Family 
Firms 
1st Generation 
Family Firms 
  2nd/Later 
Generation   
Family Firms 
A. All Family Firms 
% of Family Members or Representatives among:    
   - All Directors 17.3% 16.0% 18.3% 
   - Outside Directors 10.0% 5.8% 13.6% 
   - Inside Directors 41.0% 44.9% 37.7% 
   - Nominating Committee Members 19.1% 15.0% 21.5% 
Governance Index 9.38 8.93 9.76 
Firm-Years with a Family CEO 600 323 277 
Firm-Years with a Family Chairman of the Board 703 381 322 
% Board Seats Controlled Minus % Shares Owned 2.0% 1.6% 2.2% 
% Board Seats Controlled Minus % Votes Controlled -1.9% -1.6% -2.1% 
    
B. Family Firms with Disproportional Board Representation 
% Board Seats Controlled Minus % Shares Owned 11.1% 10.6% 11.4% 
Firm-Years in which % Board Seats > % Shares Owned 755 321 434 
% Board Seats Controlled Minus % Votes Controlled 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
Firm-Years in which % Board Seats > % Votes Controlled 705 299 406 
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Table VII 
Impact of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms on Firm Value 
Coefficients from OLS regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s q on additional family control obtained through 
various mechanisms, and other firm characteristics. Additional control via dual-class stock and voting agreements is 
the difference between the percentage of votes owned by the family and the percentage of shares they own. 
Additional control via pyramids is the difference between the percentage of votes controlled by the family and the 
percentage of votes they own. Additional control via board representation is the difference between the percentage 
of family members or representatives in the firm’s Board of Directors and the percentage of votes controlled through 
the other three mechanisms. q is measured as the ratio of the firm’s market value to total assets.  For firms with non-
tradable share classes, the non-tradable shares are valued at the same price as the publicly traded shares. Industry-
adjusted q is the difference between the firm’s q and the asset-weighted average of the imputed qs of its segments, 
where a segment’s imputed q is the industry average q. Industry averages are computed at the most precise SIC level 
for which there is a minimum of five single-segment firms in the industry-year. The sample comprises 3,006 firm-
year observations of 515 Fortune 500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. The family firms 
subsample comprises 1,183 firm-year observations of 210 firms. t-statistics from clustered (by firm) standard errors 
appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 All Firms 
All Family 
Firms 
1st Generation 
Family Firms 
2nd/Later Gen. 
Family Firms 
% Shares Owned by the Family 0.10  0.28  -0.18  0.46  
 (0.24)  (0.60)  (-0.22)  (0.99)  
Additional Family Control via  -1.30 ** -1.16 ** -1.93 ** -0.54  
   Dual-Class Stock (-2.51)  (-2.09)  (-2.46)  (-0.70)  
Additional Family Control via  0.22  0.95  1.44  2.60 * 
   Voting Agreements (0.23)  (0.82)  (1.00)  (1.78)  
Additional Family Control via Pyramids 1.52  2.64 ** 3.92 * 2.67 * 
 (1.58)  (2.16)  (1.82)  (1.88)  
Additional Family Control via  -1.39  -1.07  -1.26  -0.26  
   Disproportional Board Representation (-1.45)  (-0.94)  (-0.76)  (-0.29)  
Family-CEO or Chairman 0.33 ** 0.38 *** 0.68 *** 0.20 * 
 (2.59)  (3.00)  (2.84)  (1.74)  
First Generation 0.31 ** 0.35 **     
 (2.12)  (2.40)      
Governance Index -0.03  0.02  0.07  -0.03  
 (-1.47)  (0.56)  (1.37)  (-1.17)  
% of Shares Owned by Non-Family  -0.59 *** -0.83 * -2.08 *** -0.00  
   Blockholders (-2.61)  (-1.82)  (-2.69)  (-0.01)  
Additional Votes Owned by Non-Family  -0.65  -1.87 ** -1.94  -0.70  
   Blockholders (-1.11)  (-2.56)  (-1.19)  (-1.11)  
Market Risk (Beta) 0.10  0.20  0.34  0.02  
 (1.15)  (1.16)  (1.17)  (0.13)  
Idiosyncratic Risk -0.18  -0.08  0.32  -0.37  
 (-1.04)  (-0.33)  (0.88)  (-1.09)  
Diversification -0.32 *** -0.48 *** -0.51 ** -0.37 *** 
 (-3.51)  (-3.33)  (-2.19)  (-2.68)  
CAPX/PPE 0.53  0.37  0.41  0.27  
 (1.47)  (1.21)  (1.26)  (0.29)  
Dividends/Book Equity 0.28  0.94 *** -0.34  1.20 ** 
 (1.52)  (3.45)  (-0.31)  (2.44)  
Debt/Market Value of Equity -0.23 *** -0.32  -0.21  -0.43 *** 
 (-3.50)  (-1.62)  (-0.90)  (-2.91)  
Log of Assets 0.08 * 0.12  0.15  0.08  
 (1.96)  (1.50)  (1.15)  (1.18)  
Intercept -0.63  -1.53 * -2.21  -0.62  
 (-1.37)  (-1.77)  (-1.58)  (-0.88)  
R-squared  0.12  0.14  0.12  0.22  
No. of Observations 3006  1183  540  643  
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Table VIII 
Impact of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms on Firm Value: Alternative Measure of Control 
Coefficients from OLS regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s q on additional family control obtained through 
various mechanisms, and other firm characteristics. Additional control via dual-class stock and voting agreements is 
the ratio of the percentage of votes owned by the family to the percentage of shares they own. Additional control via 
pyramids is the ratio of the percentage of votes controlled by the family to the percentage of votes they own. 
Additional control via board representation is the ratio of the percentage of family members or representatives in the 
firm’s Board of Directors to the percentage of votes controlled through the other three mechanisms. q is measured as 
the ratio of the firm’s market value to total assets.  For firms with non-tradable share classes, the non-tradable shares 
are valued at the same price as the publicly traded shares. Industry-adjusted q is the difference between the firm’s q 
and the asset-weighted average of the imputed qs of its segments, where a segment’s imputed q is the industry 
average q. Industry averages are computed at the most precise SIC level for which there is a minimum of five single-
segment firms in the industry-year. The sample comprises 3,006 firm-year observations of 515 Fortune 500 firms 
listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. The family firms subsample comprises 1,183 firm-year observations 
of 210 firms. t-statistics from clustered (by firm) standard errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 All Firms 
All Family 
Firms 
1st Generation 
Family Firms 
2nd/Later Gen. 
Family Firms 
% Shares Owned by the Family -0.05  0.24  -0.31  0.44  
 (-0.12)  (0.48)  (-0.34)  (0.97)  
Additional Family Control via  -0.04  -0.02  -0.04  0.00  
   Dual-Class Stock (-1.47)  (-0.61)  (-1.48)  (0.04)  
Additional Family Control via  0.14 ** 0.16 ** 0.24 *** 0.76  
   Voting Agreements (2.23)  (2.19)  (3.58)  (1.52)  
Additional Family Control via Pyramids 0.37 * 0.49 ** 0.89 * 0.34 ** 
 (1.71)  (2.00)  (1.91)  (2.03)  
Additional Family Control via  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  0.00  
   Disproportional Board Representation (-1.11)  (-0.67)  (-0.45)  (-0.12)  
Family-CEO or Chairman 0.28 ** 0.34 *** 0.62 *** 0.20 * 
 (2.35)  (2.79)  (2.70)  (1.81)  
First Generation 0.32 ** 0.37 **     
 (2.17)  (2.48)      
Governance Index -0.02  0.02  0.07  -0.03  
 (-1.27)  (0.67)  (1.24)  (-1.08)  
% of Shares Owned by Non-Family  -0.46 * -0.11  -1.86 *** 0.39  
   Blockholders (-1.72)  (-0.24)  (-2.74)  (1.64)  
Additional Votes Owned by Non-Family  0.00  -0.19  -0.42 ** 0.12  
   Blockholders (0.04)  (-1.54)  (-2.07)  (1.10)  
Market Risk (Beta) 0.12  0.20  0.32  0.02  
 (1.31)  (1.13)  (1.08)  (0.15)  
Idiosyncratic Risk -0.18  -0.18  0.40  -0.38  
 (-1.04)  (-0.83)  (1.29)  (-1.14)  
Diversification -0.33 *** -0.50 *** -0.55 ** -0.37 *** 
 (-3.56)  (-3.46)  (-2.33)  (-2.75)  
CAPX/PPE 0.52  0.36  0.31  0.36  
 (1.39)  (1.11)  (1.01)  (0.39)  
Dividends/Book Equity 0.28  1.01 *** -0.21  1.20 ** 
 (1.52)  (3.52)  (-0.19)  (2.44)  
Debt/Market Value of Equity -0.24 *** -0.35 * -0.22  -0.46 *** 
 (-3.51)  (-1.70)  (-0.92)  (-3.13)  
Log of Assets 0.08 ** 0.13  0.15  0.09  
 (2.05)  (1.52)  (1.14)  (1.30)  
Intercept -1.16 ** -2.07 ** -2.85  -1.98 ** 
 (-2.36)  (-2.10)  (-1.57)  (-2.14)  
R-squared  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.22  
No. of Observations 3006  1183  540  643  
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Table IX 
Determinants of Families’ Choice of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms  
Probit models of the choice between using or not using each mechanism. Use of each mechanism is measured by a 
dummy. Dual-class stock equals one when the firm has two or more classes of stock with differential voting rights. 
Voting agreements are pacts among shareholders that result in the family holding voting power over a larger number 
of shares than what it owns with investment power. Pyramids are defined as control structures where the family 
holds its shares of the firm indirectly through one or more intermediate entities such as trusts, foundations, limited 
partnerships, or any other form of corporation in which the family owns less than 100% but more than 20%. 
Additional board control equals one when the percentage of family members or representatives in the firm’s Board 
of Directors exceeds the percentage of votes controlled via dual-class stock, voting agreements, and/or pyramids, 
and equals zero otherwise. All models include sector and year dummies. The sample comprises 3,006 firm-year 
observations of 515 Fortune 500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. The family firms subsample 
comprises 1,183 firm-year observations of 210 firms. z-statistics from clustered (by firm) standard errors appear in 
parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
   Dual-Class Stock Voting Agreements         Pyramids 
 Disproportional  
      Board   
  Representation 
 Coef. dF/dx  Coef. dF/dx  Coef. dF/dx  Coef. dF/dx  
Dual-Class Stock    -0.64 -0.020  0.03 0.000  -1.11 -0.414 *** 
    (-1.34)   (0.08)   (-4.51)   
Voting Agreements -0.96 -0.079 **    0.82 0.020 ** 0.16 0.060  
 (-1.98)      (1.97)   (0.35)   
Pyramids 0.14 0.023  0.67 0.058     0.29 0.110  
 (0.25)   (1.11)      (0.52)   
Disproportional Board  -1.03 -0.183 *** -0.01 -0.001  0.46 0.003     
   Representation (-4.41)   (-0.03)   (1.33)      
% of Family Holdings  -0.80 -0.122  -3.02 -0.141 *** 2.86 0.023 *** 1.49 0.583 *** 
   in Trusts (-1.22)   (-4.51)   (2.62)   (2.91)   
% of Family Holdings  -0.06 -0.009  -1.41 -0.066 ** 6.65 0.054 *** 0.28 0.109  
   in Corporations (-0.09)   (-2.19)   (4.58)   (0.43)   
% of Family Holdings  -0.42 -0.064  -1.57 -0.073 *** 4.07 0.033 *** 1.76 0.687 *** 
   in Limited Partnerships (-0.58)   (-3.29)   (3.46)   (2.85)   
% of Family Holdings  -2.55 -0.386 *** -0.71 -0.033  4.15 0.034 *** 1.81 0.707 *** 
   in Foundations (-2.66)   (-0.67)   (2.76)   (2.76)   
% of Family Holdings  -0.94 -0.143  -2.18 -0.102 *** 3.98 0.032 *** 2.51 0.981 *** 
   Owned Directly (-1.59)   (-4.38)   (3.44)   (5.34)   
Family-CEO or Chairman 0.31 0.044  -0.10 -0.005  0.74 0.005  0.07 0.027  
 (1.42)   (-0.37)   (1.46)   (0.37)   
First Generation -0.70 -0.104 *** -0.70 -0.032 ** -1.00 -0.009 ** -0.19 -0.076  
 (-2.79)   (-2.2)   (-2.49)   (-0.9)   
Governance Index -0.01 -0.002  -0.05 -0.002  0.07 0.001  0.07 0.027 ** 
 (-0.29)   (-0.97)   (1.03)   (2.15)   
% of Shares Owned by 0.38 0.058  0.47 0.022  -0.45 -0.004  0.19 0.074  
Non-Family Blockholders (0.97)   (1.45)   (-0.59)   (0.54)   
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Table IX 
Determinants of Families’ Choice of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms (continued) 
 
   Dual-Class Stock Voting Agreements        Pyramids 
 Disproportional  
      Board   
  Representation 
 Coef. dF/dx  Coef. dF/dx  Coef. dF/dx  Coef. dF/dx  
Tobin’s q -0.16 -0.025 * -0.09 -0.004  -0.44 -0.004 ** -0.09 -0.035 * 
 (-1.75)   (-1.05)   (-2.25)   (-1.91)   
Market Risk (Beta) 0.39 0.059  0.72 0.034 ** 0.01 0.000  0.15 0.058  
 (1.61)   (2.04)   (0.02)   (0.77)   
Idiosyncratic Risk -0.25 -0.037  -0.61 -0.029  0.91 0.007 ** -0.33 -0.129  
 (-0.7)   (-1.37)   (2.29)   (-0.82)   
Diversification 0.23 0.034  0.16 0.007  -0.06 0.000  0.26 0.101  
 (1.11)   (0.64)   (-0.23)   (1.62)   
CAPX/PPE 0.30 0.045  0.36 0.017  -1.27 -0.010 * -0.42 -0.165  
 (1.27)   (1.04)   (-1.81)   (-0.94)   
Dividends/Book Equity -0.18 -0.027  0.33 0.015  -3.60 -0.029  -0.86 -0.336 * 
 (-0.46)   (0.80)   (-0.90)   (-1.74)   
Debt/Mkt Value of Equity 0.19 0.029  -0.87 -0.040 ** 0.14 0.001  -0.23 -0.089 * 
 (1.3)   (-1.97)   (0.70)   (-1.67)   
Log of Assets 0.04 0.006  -0.22 -0.010 * 0.25 0.002  0.12 0.048  
 (0.38)   (-1.87)   (1.42)   (1.26)   
Log-Likelihood -374.27   -172.72   -113.79   -575.7   
Pseudo R-Squared 0.27   0.28   0.48   0.28   
No. of Observations 1183   1183   1183   1183   
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